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2.1 Introduction
Despite the reasoned claims and detailed research of many social sci-
entists that much of humanity lives in an increasingly multicultural 
world, the ever-present threat of a set of partitions between “us” and 
“them” transnationally (but also within countries), seems certain to 
linger for some years forward. While there is no final answer to the 
question, “Can’t we all just get along?,” so seemingly simplified by 
Rodney King in the aftermath of his beating by Los Angeles police 
in 1991 and subsequent riots (which led to the deaths of more than 
50 people three months later in 1992, when those officers who had bru-
talized him were acquitted of crimes of excessive force (National Public 
Radio, 2008)), the incommensurability on multiple levels of such a plea 
still haunts the supposed naïve proposal of tolerance and respect for 
difference, let alone celebration of diversity, embedded in a normative 
liberal multiculturalism.
In this chapter, I discuss the development of multiculturalism in 
Japan against the background of global retrenchments over and to mul-
ticulturalism, visible as a fragile project. Such a project is set against a 
background of global events that can make theorizing about the future 
of tolerance and respect for difference appear to be embedded in a hope-
lessly optimistic utopian dream at any moment, when periodic renewed 
calls for retribution against the perpetrators of terror attacks, to name 
just one instantiation of a globalized political event that recurs in the 
contemporary post 9/11 world, unfolding at a rapid pace, highlighted 
by targeted drone strikes and invisible communications monitoring, 
and channeled by media spectacularization of cultural difference as the 
prominent causal agent of conflict.
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The focus of this chapter is multiculturalism in Japan and Asia more 
generally. This is not because Japan is the best or most dynamic exam-
ple of a multicultural society in Asia or even that there are relatively 
straightforward connections between other Asian countries and Japan 
directly linked to multiculturalism. At the conclusion of the chapter, 
I will briefly review a case that has been made that Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan share similar trajectories in multicultural policies and trends, 
despite rather distinct histories and resident groups of minorities. More 
specifically, however, in connection with the global future of multicul-
turalism as a vision of 21st century society, the case of Japan offers some 
corrective to the prominent mainstream discussions of multiculturalism 
which are taking place currently in Europe, North America, Australia, 
and New Zealand. Is Japan belatedly following immigration trends seen 
earlier in other places, or is there something new about Japan’s contri-
bution to multicultural policies and multicultural nation-building? Or 
is Japan simply a late adopter of policies, under duress of demographic 
pressures, which are increasingly under attack elsewhere?
In the first part of the chapter, I place the discussion of multicultural-
ism’s end firmly as a hegemonic Eurocentric discourse. In the second 
part, I turn to a discussion of multiculturalism in Japan. Certainly this 
is an expansive topic, so I will simply point to some exemplary trends in 
Japanese society that suggest that multiculturalism is not moribund, if 
not exactly thriving, requiring a discussion of the need for many kinds 
of qualifications and criticisms: political, economic, and otherwise. 
In terms of sheer numbers, Japan cannot be considered particularly 
diverse by the standards of large immigrant countries such as Canada 
and Australia. Moreover, the diversity that does exist is masked in many 
ways by the presence of large minorities of phenotypically similar 
ethni cities, in particular Chinese and Koreans and indigenous peoples. 
I argue that the Japanese case provides a well-balanced, if tenuous, 
example by which to track the development of multicultural coexist-
ence (in the Japanese phrase tabunka kyoˉsei) in a large economically 
advanced democratic society of the 21st century. This phrase for the 
understanding of Japanese multicultural society, more widely circu-
lated in the aftermath of the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995 and 
the cooperation that developed between ethnic communities in Kobe 
(Okano & Tsuneyoshi, 2011; Takezawa, 2008), who came quickly to 
the understanding borne of necessity that mutual aid and coopera-
tion would hasten their survival and recovery efforts, is not without 
its detractors and drawbacks, as I will note below. However, it offers an 
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alternative view to where we, as a human community, find ourselves in 
the 21st century, learning to get along with each other in the world.1 
Japan’s version of multiculturalism, I will argue, has something to sug-
gest not about the end of multiculturalism, but a possible new direction 
for multicultural understanding or post-multicultural coexistence.
2.2 The end of multiculturalism
The idea of the end of multiculturalism has been much discussed in recent 
years, particularly in Europe, where dissatisfaction with the integ ration of 
Muslim minorities has led to a significant backlash against open-ended 
immigration and tolerance (Alexander, 2013).2 Despite this generalized 
reaction to the negative aspects of 30–40 years of multicultural policies, 
there is little agreement as to what should come after it. As Kymlicka 
(2010, p. 97) puts it, “there is a surprising consensus that we are indeed 
in a post-multicultural era,” with near uniform disdain for the reduction-
ism of multiculturalism parodied as the “panoply of customs, traditions, 
music, and cuisine” (also known as the three Cs: customs, celebrations 
and cuisine, or the four Fs: folklore, food, fashion, and festivals). I give a 
further definition of multicultura lism below, but it is important to point 
out from the outset that there are numerous “multiculturalisms,” from 
conservative to liberal to critical, with the versions parodied above by 
the pithy reduction to identifiable characteristic material aspects of foods 
and clothes serving as a shorthand for symbolic multiculti.3
Mishra (2012), writing about why what he calls the “crisis” of liberal 
multiculturalism signals that multiculturalism is a problem itself that 
needs to be continuously redefined, suggests that a key question is the 
incommensurability of the universality of rights clashing with the prob-
lems of what he and others refer to as the politics of redistribution. In 
other words, there is an inherent insolubility to the problem of recogni-
tion versus the political and economic policies that can be promoted to 
facilitate and enhance justice for minorities, especially newcomers who 
more often than not come to a society with little capital—economic 
or social. Either recognition is seen by the politicians, majorities, and 
ordinary citizens of a given community as sufficient in itself, in place 
of solving other pressing problems, or even worse, it leads to a back-
lash among the majority and other communities (including minorities 
themselves) who do not feel they gain (or in some cases fear that they 
will lose their own jobs and positions) from such a form of politics, tied 
as it often is to demands for equal opportunities.
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Within four months of each other at the end of 2010 and the beginning 
of 2011, the prime ministers and president of Europe’s three most 
powerful countries declared multiculturalism a failure. Angela Merkel 
stated that multiculturalism in Germany had “failed utterly,” David 
Cameron argued that in Britain “the doctrine of state multiculturalism” 
had failed to give “a vision of society,” and Nikolas Sarkozy said that 
France had been “too concerned with the identity of the person arriv-
ing and not enough with the identity of the country receiving” them. 
Multiculturalism as a state policy (or set of policies) has been judged by 
many, including these conservative leaders, as a finished affair, and the 
time was ripe for new ways to deal with minorities, who are, it is argued, 
not cooperative enough in adjusting to the society in which they seek to 
live, either temporarily or for the long term. Such blaming of the “other” 
for not fitting in has a long trajectory in conservative European politics, 
intersecting with and growing out of seminal mediated “events” such as 
the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005 and l’affaire du foulard: bans on school-
girls wearing head scarves in France and other countries.4
Multiculturalism has been increasingly attacked by liberal and radical 
critics as well (Kundnani, 2012; Murphy, 2012). It goes without saying 
that a comprehensive term such as multiculturalism has been easily 
critiqued from all corners as it can serve as a proxy for whatever is ailing 
21st century societies and causing lack of solidarity among citizens who 
find themselves less and less able to appeal to so-called common identi-
fiable values. Kivisto (2012, p. 853) writes of the claims of conservative 
multiculturalism critics, “that diversity inevitably undermines a more 
universalistic form of solidarity—that the solidarities of particular groups 
impede or undermine national solidarity.” This implies a zero sum game 
in which people must choose one or the other identity (the particular or 
the national/cosmopolitan/universal), not both, and that there cannot 
be a collective identity that embraces both. But in order to examine this 
question we first need a working definition of multiculturalism.
2.3 Defining multiculturalism
While there are many versions of multiculturalism, from liberal to criti-
cal,5 a prime distinction needs to be made between multiculturalism as 
philosophy and policy (Murphy, 2012, p. 4). Reducing philosophies to 
more concrete foci, Murphy (2012, p. 62) lists the following seven types of 
multicultural arguments: (1) liberal multiculturalism; (2) tolerationist mul-
ticulturalism; (3) the value of cultural diversity; (4) the politics of inclusion; 
(5) deliberative multiculturalism; (6) democratic multiculturalism; and 
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(7) the politics of recognition. Many of these nuanced differences revolve 
around the “classic” liberal question of freedom versus the prevention 
of harm and address central political questions such as equality, accom-
modation of minorities, and social cohesion (Murphy, 2012, pp. 7–9). 
A critique of this type of distinction could be made that that the particu-
lar policy framework and the philosophy on which it is based are not 
always identifiable in a singular fashion. In other words, policies can be 
derived from many sources, problems, ideals, and everything between.
Perhaps a single definition is impossible, but Vertovec (2010) lists the 
many areas of “institutional objectives” that have come to define multi-
cultural policies. These included providing opportunities for group rep-
resentation to local and national government authorities; restructuring 
institutions towards pluralistic public service provision; putting in place 
measures to promote equality, respect, or tolerance, particularly among 
the dominant population towards minorities; and providing resources 
to support continuity of traditions and identities among immigrant 
groups (as opposed to assimilation) (Vertovec, 2010, p. 84).
Another distinction is made by Kymlicka (2010), who argues that 
three patterns related to multiculturalism have emerged in Western 
democracies: (1) new forms of empowerment for indigenous peoples; 
(2) new forms of autonomy for sub-state national groups; and (3) new 
forms of citizenship for immigrants. One repeated question is whether 
these groups with different histories, different aspirations for belonging 
to the mainstream society, and different motivations for seeking recog-
nition should be considered together by policy makers or separately. 
For example, some authors argue that the inclusion of “voluntary” 
immigrants with other groups involves diluting the focus of multicul-
turalism ( Joppke, 2004), leading to hostility and disorder. The rights 
and benefits in many societies obtained by indigenous and sub-state 
national groups have been much greater than those of immigrants, 
partly due to recognition of their “blood sacrifice” in the face of the 
historical hegemony of the dominant national group, as well as inter-
national recognition received from the United Nations (UN) and other 
organizations (Mishra, 2012, pp. 53–54). With regard to Japan, indi-
genous groups have applicability as a category (Zainichi Koreans,6 Ainu, 
and Okinawans) as do immigrants.
Critiques of multiculturalism have often asserted contradictions through 
conflations in theorizing about who and what is multicultural. Modood 
(2007, p. 119) points out five levels of what he refers to as “multi family 
resemblances.” Differences that affect specific policies in specific spatial 
domains (place and time) are: (1) differences between groups (as alluded 
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to above); (2) labeling based on different types of attributes (such as race 
or religion); (3) groups not acting the same; (4) groups having different 
priorities; and (5) individuals within groups differing.
Another key argument used against multiculturalism is to look for the 
most extreme case of minorities’ failure to integrate or even criminal 
misbehavior and suggest that it is sanctioned by multiculturalism itself 
in its emphasis on freedom based on cultural rights, in effect conflat-
ing ideas advocated by some multicultural theories of epistemological 
anti-foundationalism with radical relativism, which is advocated by 
relatively few (Murphy, 2012, p. 24).
Despite the negative reception for multiculturalism recently in aca-
demic and popular discourses, there is an irony in the widespread success 
of multicultural policies (Kymlicka, 2010; Modood, 2012; Vertovec, 2010). 
Thus, even as the leaders and mainstream media of many countries deem 
multicultural policies a failure, the policies, plans, implementation, and 
acceptance of multiculturalism in everyday life continues more or less as 
it did at its high point in the 1990s.
In a different way, multiculturalism has been boosted by the simple 
fact of increased levels of diversity in many countries that have accepted 
immigrants. Not only is immigration increasing,7 but the types of 
immigration and routes are changing, and there is more frequent and 
short-term movement, instead of permanent migration. In addition, 
families with multiple ethnicities, and individuals with multiple and 
hyphenated identities, are also increasing. Vertovec (2010) has proposed 
the term “super-diversity” to describe these developments.
The best that one can conclude at the current juncture about multi-
culturalism is to suggest that it is in a crisis moment. This is inherent in 
recent analysis, using terminology such as “panicked multiculturalism” 
(Noble, 2013) and “ambivalent multiculturalism” (Bygnes, 2012). While 
the immigrant countries of Western Europe and North America (as well 
as Australia and New Zealand) seek to contain their overdone stresses to 
the social fabric and resultant distress over policies that were beneficial 
to their economies at one time, but now require more attention (both 
economic and political), it is not surprising that interest in diversity, 
migration, and multiculturalism would have spread to new places. In 
the next section, I turn to a discussion of Japanese multiculturalism.
2.4 Japan as an exemplar
Japan’s history of accepting immigrants is a long and varied one.8 As 
Oguma (2002) has shown in his well-cited study of the flexibility of 
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inclusivity of “Japanese-ness”, which extended to Taiwanese and Korean 
peoples in the Japanese colonial period, a much more porous image of 
what was a “Japanese” was prevalent than the one that has dominated 
in contemporary Japan as “one nation, one civilization, one language, 
one culture and one race” ( Japan Times, 2005) until recently.9 Similar 
research by Morris-Suzuki (1997, 2006) and others shows the deep 
interconnections with and movements of peoples between the Korean 
peninsula and Japan both over historically long periods of time and in 
the modern era in the periods before and after the Second World War. 
In particular, much of the assumption of a period of little or no immi-
gration during the 35 years after the Second World War (until roughly 
1980) can be challenged as masking what she calls the “invisibility” of 
illegal immigration, along with the growing institutional architecture 
of detention facilities and courts for deportation (Morris-Suzuki, 2006).
The rise of tabunka shugi (multiculturalism) or tabunka kyoˉsei shakai 
(multicultural existence society)10 can be said to have commenced in the 
1990s as the total number of foreign residents topped one million.11 This 
is not to suggest that activism over the human rights of foreign residents 
(Koreans in particular) in Japan had not existed before this period,12 but 
that a level of consciousness in the wider society was attained following the 
pattern of increased numbers and increased diversity among minorities 
(including foreigners) in Japan in the 1990s. Several years after this, in 
approximately 1995, the number of Japanese residents of Korean nation-
ality dropped for the first time since the end of the war to less than half 
of the total foreign resident population (Tsuneyoshi, 2011, p. 128), and 
has continued to descend to its current total of 530,048, or 26.1% of the 
total number of foreign residents as of 2012, falling behind the number 
of Chinese, who have occupied the top position of total numbers of 
residents in Japan (by nationality) since 2007. This is explained by a 
continuous rate of naturalization of long-term Korean residents since the 
mid-1980s, when Japanese law was changed (roughly 10,000 per year), as 
well as the increasing numbers of new immigrants from China (and else-
where). For the past four years the overall number of foreign residents 
has been decreasing to a total in 2012 of 2,033,658, approximately 1.7% 
of the total population in Japan.13 Much of this decline can be attrib-
uted to that of a single nationality, Brazilians (the third highest national 
group until 2012, when Filipinos surpassed Brazilians for the first time), 
many of whom lost employment opportunities in the economic down-
turn since 2008, while other groups (with the small continuous decline 
in Korean numbers as noted above) have either declined or risen only 
slightly. The number of Chinese residents continued to rise even after 
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2008, reaching a high or 678,391 in 2010, but then declined slightly in 
the subsequent two years. The number of Filipino residents, as of 2012 
registering 202,974, third after Koreans, has risen every year (except 
2004) until 2012, when there was a small decrease. The number of 
Vietnamese has also risen almost every year and even further in 2012 to 
attain the position of the fifth highest at a total of 52,364. Of the top 
11 foreign resident nationalities, eight of them are Asian (the exceptions 
being Brazil, Peru at number six, and the USA at number seven). 
From this brief and necessarily cursory statistical overview, one 
can state two things. First the range and degree of diversity has been 
increasing steadily, illustrating, albeit on a somewhat limited scale, the 
proposition of superdiversity noted above. Notwithstanding the drops 
in overall numbers, the countries involved each have different patterns 
of increases and drops that correspond to historical, economic, and 
social issues that affect ethnic groups differently. This is even more 
apparent when the rates of different prefectures are examined, a discus-
sion which I will bracket due to space limitations. However, the pattern 
of immigration throughout Japan shows a great deal of variation, with 
the percentage of Chinese immigrants largest in Tokyo, Koreans largest 
in Osaka, and Brazilians largest in Aichi. Second, the use of numbers 
of immigrants statistics is deceptive in that if one considers only these 
numbers, much of the growing diversity in Japan in the past two dec-
ades will be overlooked. There are, for example, sizeable populations 
of indigenous minorities, Okinawans and Ainu, as well as increasing 
numbers of individuals who have two ethnicities—for example mixed 
Japanese heritage or hyphenated Japanese.14
While it is also true that some have argued that, phenotypically, 
the majority of non-Japanese in Japan (also including the indigenous 
minority populations) closely resemble Japanese and are often indis-
tinguishable, there is surely an increase in the awareness of Japan as 
a multicultural society. Important edited volumes in English on mul-
ticulturalism in Japan have been published in succession in recent 
years (Graburn, Ertl, & Tierney, 2008; Tsuneyoshi, 2011; Willis & 
Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008; the latter calling its field transnationalism 
as opposed to multiculturalism), each utilizing a wide range of case 
studies to make the case for an increase in multiculturalism as an indis-
putable reality, while reaching varying conclusions about its greater 
acceptance. Certainly there will be a great divergence in this acceptance 
across Japan, as variation will exist with almost no sign of diversity 
in many rural prefectures (but see below for a counter example), and 
much higher diversity in some urbanized areas (up to 20% minority 
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populations in some parts of Shinjuku Ward in Tokyo). This has led at 
least one critic to maintain that the positive recognition and conceptu-
alization of multiculturalism as a “new” reality, albeit based on a policy 
discourse regime that has roots in government initiatives, is a reaction 
by (mostly) foreign scholars to the persistent discourses of Nihonjinron 
in the 1980s and later into the 1990s (Burgess, 2007).15 Many other 
critics have agreed that at the national policy level there is little in the 
way of aggressive support or legislation for multicultural society,16 while 
at the local level there exists, in some places, a growing movement for 
expansion of rights and inclusion of minorities and a concomitant flow 
of policy influence from the local to the national (Flowers, 2012; Green, 
2013; Lovell, 2010; Nakamatsu, 2013). I discuss these trends at greater 
length below.
Other edited publications in Japanese have also been published 
recently foregrounding the concept of tabunka kyoˉsei (Fujimaki, 2012; 
Kagami, 2013; Satake, 2011), documenting the diversity that exists 
primarily in prefectures in urban areas with the largest concentrations 
of non-Japanese (in absolute numbers and percentage of the total of 
foreign residents, the order is Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Saitama, 
Chiba, Hyogo, and Shizuoka, each with large cities except for Shizuoka, 
which does not have a city larger than one million people).17 Earlier 
publications had used the term tabunka shakai (Ishii & Yamauchi, 1999; 
Komai, 2003). Whether there is now a consistent agreement in the past 
decade on the preferential use of tabunka kyoˉsei is beyond the scope of 
analysis here. However, Graburn and Ertl (2008, p. 8), point out, as have 
others, that the concept of kyoˉsei, or coexistence, tends to allow differ-
ences to remain as unsettled and not melded.18 In researching this topic, 
clearly there are valuable studies on many individual minority groups, 
relating their struggles for recognition and equal rights to the theme of 
a multicultural Japan, which due to space limitations I will not review. 
In analyzing the problem of multiculturalism from a holistic and 
comparative perspective, there is a danger that the important details 
that separate different groups are left unstated and underanalyzed. 
Multiculturalism, through its terminology, draws analysis away from 
the specific to the general and categorical. To cite just two compelling 
recent studies, Cotterill (2011) writing about the Ainu19 notes a govern-
ment survey of 23,782 self-acknowledged Ainu in Hokkaido. However, 
the actual numbers are far greater, with many having intermarried with 
other Japanese, many living in metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, and 
a large number becoming more interested in reclaiming some part of 
their long submerged identity, but not necessarily “coming out” to 
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their neighbors, and even in some cases family members. In a similar 
manner, Hankins (2012) in doing research on Buraku20 minorities, sug-
gests a new interest in “authenticity” of identity. One of the strategies 
used is the display of suffering, which exists in a dialectic fashion, i.e. 
by displaying marginalization, one has more authentically “suffered” 
discrimination, which serves to increase pride in self-identification for 
those who are part of the group, but also among affirming groups in 
Japanese society such as progressives, social activists, and others who 
take interest in multiculturalism.
However, persistent doubts remain about the extent to which Japan can 
be considered multicultural in any recognizable sense at all, and similar 
to other countries, mediatized events can produce understandings that 
conflict harshly with the idea of Japan as multicultural. Perhaps it is not 
surprising given the aforementioned politicians’ comments on Japan as 
one nation that the perception exists among some internationally of 
Japan as a “monoethnic” enclave. After Norwegian far-right extremist 
Anders Breivik was arrested for killing 77 people in Norway in July 2011, 
his manifesto of more than 1,500 pages, which he had uploaded to the 
Internet shortly before he carried out his massacre, was examined, and 
numerous references praising both Japan and South Korea as “monocul-
tural” and for having rejected or avoided multiculturalism were discov-
ered ( Japan Probe, 2011; Reuters, 2011).21
On a more serious level are critiques such as Kashiwazaki’s analysis 
that immigrants are incorporated into Japan first and foremost as “for-
eigners,” and not as “ethnic minorities,” or “hyphenated Japanese” 
(2013, p. 32). Given the movement towards greater recognition of 
Japanese national minorities noted above, albeit incremental and still 
in the face of hardships and discrimination, a question that is inevita-
ble is whether, as in Kymlicka’s inclusive definition above, progressive 
thinking about multiculturalism benefits from more generalized inclu-
sion of all minorities (including, but not limited to, sexual minorities, 
victims of environmental disasters, atomic bomb victims, and people 
with disabilities) as opposed to strategic focus that may allow for some 
coalitions, but not one that includes everyone on all issues. It is clear, 
whichever way this question is answered (and it is unlikely that a single 
answer will be appropriate for every context; in other words, multiple 
types of coalitions between minorities are likely to emerge in different 
regions and over different issues), the observation of Htun (2012, p. 19) 
that focus on “diversity and agency within minority groups” means less 
demand and interest for displays of suffering. The younger members 
of minority groups, especially, in contrast to previous generations, feel 
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more entitled to be open about their identity both as minorities and as 
members of a Japanese society moving towards the future, not dwelling 
on past injustices.
At the same time, however, discussion of the lived reality of multicul-
tural consciousness in Japan reveals problematic lacunae that require 
critical attention. First, what is the understanding that the mass of aver-
age Japanese citizens have about Japanese society being multicultural? 
Numerous scholars have suggested that even if a plurality of Japanese 
citizens accept Japan as multicultural, there is still little understand-
ing or acceptance of diversity beyond a division between Japanese and 
foreigners, leading to models of “coexistence” (read as assimilation) in 
the simplest form, between the “Japanese” and the “others” (Graburn & 
Ertl, 2008, p. 4; Ishiwata, 2011; Kashiwazaki, 2013; Nagayoshi, 2011; 
Nagy, 2012; Okano & Tsuneyoshi, 2011, p. 2; Yamamoto, 2012), some-
times as a homogenous group of non-Japanese and sometimes as their 
own ethnic group. In other words, the acceptance of a multicultural 
Japan (i.e. a Japan with a small percentage of resident foreigners), entails 
a reinforcement of the uniform identity of Japanese-ness, which in turn 
serves to exclude foreigners and other minorities as (not more than) 
residents, and not as part of a project for a dynamic and changing mul-
ticultural Japanese identity and society of the 21st century.
In an example of empirical work to investigate such a claim, 
Nagayoshi conducted research utilizing public opinion polls and veri-
fied that acceptance of a Japanese homogeneity coincides with support 
for “endorsement of multiculturalism.” This positive affirmation of 
diversity, however, is coupled with the conclusion that “Japanese people 
regard minorities as just ‘exceptions’ within a culturally homogenous 
society” (2011, p. 574). The question remains, however, what people 
think they are endorsing when they conceptualize multiculturalism, 
operationalized here as government assistance to minorities to “pre-
serve their customs and traditions.” Some critics argue pessimistically 
that this leads to a vision of Japanese society that Morris-Suzuki (2002, 
cited in Nakamatsu, 2013, p. 3) has termed “cosmetic multicultural-
ism,” a discourse that “allows expression of cultural diversity only under 
strict conditions … mak[ing] no demands for changes in the existing 
structure.” Or to follow this binary logic to its concluding point, “the 
positioning of the ‘other’ is always in relation to and as a means of 
further discovering what is Japanese” (Yamamoto, 2012, p. 437). Such 
arguments recall the problem raised by Mishra, at the outset in this 
chapter, that multiculturalism was (and is) always a problem in need of 
redefinition. “‘Multiculturalism’ as theory comes as a challenge to an 
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earlier definition of it as an empirical fact,” in short “cultures were part 
of the nation, without the nation itself sensing the need to theorize itself 
in terms of multiplicity of cultures” (Mishra, 2012, p. 23). The degree 
that this challenge to a prior status quo is now taking place in Japan then 
is open for debate.
Nonetheless, such a critique may underestimate the potential for 
change in consciousness that is occurring among the majority of 
Japanese, particularly young people, not only in their recognition of 
documentation and representations of otherness in Japan, but in rela-
tion to issues of education, political representation, and discriminatory 
practices (elaborated on below). Each of these offers only a starting 
point for discussion and can be framed as much as problems as they are 
hopes for the future. A point that is made clear, however, is that they 
are problems that are mostly dealt with on the local level.
There has been quite a lot of forward movement regarding local 
policy initiatives connected to multiculturalism in Japan, though not 
all of it is readily visible to the ordinary citizen. One reason is that the 
diversity in Japan is localized in some areas and relatively invisible (or 
much less) in other places, mostly (but not only) rural regions. However, 
from the central government’s side, the 2006 Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications (MIC) report, “Research Group concerning the 
Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence,” also triggered discussion about 
implementation at the local society level (chıˉki shakai). A number of 
researchers have looked at the effect of this national governmental policy 
on local policies. Shortly after the national policy report was produced, 
a letter was sent to local authorities asking them to investigate “guidelines 
and plans for the promotion of multicultural coexistence in keeping 
with the circumstances of their respective regions” (MIC letter cited in 
Aiden, 2011, p. 215). Thereafter (and shortly beforehand in some cases) 
a number of prefectures, cities, and wards made such plans (for example, 
Shinjuku Ward in 2005, Kawasaki City in 2005, Hiroshima City in 2006, 
and many more; see also Nagy, 2012). The original policy document from 
the central government divided the type of help that could be provided 
into four areas: (1) communication (language); (2) lifestyle (housing and 
employment); (3) coexistence systems in local communities (exchange 
and organizations); and (4) a more general coexistence promotion system 
(linkages with business, government and other agencies).
Nagy (2012, p. 5) has described this system critically as a “social inte-
gration system,” an attempt to fill in “gaps” rather than fostering respect 
for diversity, promotion of cultural pride, or encouraging steps towards 
citizenship. Aiden’s (2011) analysis of 22 local “multicultural coexistence 
plans” (MCPs) on the other hand is slightly more optimistic, citing the 
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effect of the MIC document on local governments, urging them to utilize 
cooperation with NGOs, NPOs, and International Exchange Associations 
to further the goals of multicultural policies. Lovell’s (2010) research on 
Nagata Ward (with an estimated 10% minority population) in Kobe argues 
that, indeed, the use of policy drivers (kokusaika or internationalization, 
and tabunka kyoˉsei) has been important in moving the discussion forward 
and creating policy documentation to address the varying needs of old-
comer and newcomer minority populations. But other research suggests 
that both local staff and NGO workers have relatively low impressions 
of tabunka kyoˉsei policies and their implementation from the top down 
(Nakamatsu, 2013). They questioned both the lack of ideological support 
and detailed concrete measures. “The government’s sudden adoption of 
a multicultural framework and of the categorization of their work as part 
of this official discourse” was deemed opportunistic and not an attempt 
to “bring about cultural, social and political equality,” exemplified by the 
unfamiliar naming involved in the term kyoˉsei coupled with the more 
understandable tabunka (Nakamatsu, 2013, p. 11).
Case studies of local area implementation fill in some of the gaps in 
understanding what may (or may not) be taking place with regard to 
action at the local level in various locations in Japan. Flowers’ (2012) 
study of Shinjuku Ward, in particular the town of Oˉkubo, which con-
tains up to 20% of non-Japanese residents (many of them Korean) and 
has been renamed an “ethnic town” by the local government, illustrates 
both the active aspects of multicultural policy making on the ground 
and the risks that are concomitant. She describes Ethnic Town Oˉkubo 
as “an entertainment destination” for the consumption of culture, e.g. 
food and other ethnic goods.
While urban areas are rightly the predominant focus of multicul-
tural activities, in Japan, as elsewhere, the rising number of foreign 
female spouses in rural areas due to the inability of farming household 
males to be able to find marriageable Japanese women as partners has 
led to tabunka kyoˉsei centers and support services in prefectures such 
as Yamagata. In addition to language education, the centers provide 
various information about health services, employment, and visas, 
and serve as spaces for socialization for the women, many from the 
Philippines, China, and other Asian countries (Kwak, 2009).
2.5 Three areas of contestation
While there are many other areas worth mentioning in regard to multi-
culturalism and multicultural policy in Japan, including the connec-
tion between integration and employment (Kibe, 2011), immigration 
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reform (Yamamoto, 2012), the relatively “extensive usage” of the term 
“foreigner” as opposed to other terms such as “citizen,” “immigrant,” 
“ethnic,” or “minority,” with the implication of there being impover-
ished models of citizenship opportunity structures (Kashiwazaki, 2013), 
I turn in this section to three critical areas of implementation and con-
testation that will have strong effects on the long-term success (or lack 
thereof) of multiculturalism in Japan. These are (1) education; (2) local 
political participation; and (3) anti-discrimination legal frameworks.
Education and multiculturalism is a well-researched topic and many 
frameworks for understanding different and varied developments have 
been advanced. If one includes the pioneering efforts in both Korean 
and Burakumin communities to promote education for human rights, 
multicultural education can be considered to have a long history in 
Japan. Tai (2007) documents the many nuances of Korean ethnic edu-
cation connected to civil rights, particularly in Osaka City, home to 
the largest number of Koreans in Japan. Koreans’ campaign for ethnic 
classes (which include language, music, history, and other topics) in 
mainstream schools was partly inspired by the notions of “liberation 
education” that had been developed previously by Buraku activists (Tai, 
2007, p. 8). While placing great emphasis on human rights and the 
struggles that have achieved them to date, such education is also some-
what limited by its separation into the majority/minority communities 
(Tsuneyoshi, 2011; see also Okano, 2006).
In contrast, a framework of internationalization for education is used 
for newcomer education (as well as Japanese returnees from abroad). 
Much of this education focuses on Japanese language learning. In 
public schools there is no special budget for teachers who can teach in 
students’ native languages. Research on Brazilian and Peruvian school-
children (many Nikkei22 and some with mixed ethnicity) shows some of 
the problems of education in a multicultural Japan. Moorehead’s (2013) 
examination of the “Amigos Room” at an elementary school in central 
Japan shows that teachers are sometimes unenthusiastic (they are not 
specialized, but chosen to staff the room in rotation) and the room is 
not well supplied and serves not as a place for supplementary Japanese 
language instruction so much as a space for students to overcome their 
feelings of isolation by being with immigrants like themselves.
Next, I turn to local political participation. Kawasaki City in Kanagawa 
Prefecture became the first city in Japan to establish an assembly for 
foreign residents in 1996. This was followed by other cities: Tokyo (1997), 
Kyoto (1998), Mitaka (1999), Atsugi (2002) and others (Green, 2013). 
Kawasaki also became the first city in Japan to abolish the requirement 
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of Japanese citizenship to work for the municipal government. In 2009, 
Kawasaki passed a resolution to allow foreign residents to vote in local 
elections and referenda. Both Kwak (2009) and Green (2013) make a 
strong case for the effect that local policy initiatives have made on the 
larger national policy perspective. “The significance of the foreigners’ 
assembly may be trivialized because of a lack of political power. In real-
ity, however, the activities of the assembly have a meaningful influence 
on decision making through propositions” (Kwak, 2009, p. 173). Even 
in the absence of central government leadership, cities like Kawasaki 
“found it in their interest to try and incorporate their immigrant popu-
lations into the decision making process. What began as a means of 
dialogue with foreign residents in Kawasaki gradually spread through-
out the country, eventually turning into codified local voting rights for 
a variety of cities” (Green, 2013).
Finally, regarding anti-discrimination and legal frameworks, numer-
ous authors have pointed out the lack of such protections in Japan. 
In 2006, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance filed a report on his Mission to 
Japan in which he criticized discrimination of both a social-economic 
and political nature. He also “note[d] with concern that there is no 
national legislation that outlaws racial discrimination and provides a 
judicial remedy for the victims” (Diène, 2006). This report was followed 
up in 2010 by another, the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights Special Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights 
of Migrants (Bustamante, 2010), reiterating the lack of legislation to 
“address the persistence of racial discrimination,” especially as related 
to migrants and their difficulties in securing education. Most notable as 
well was the declaration that there was an “overall lack of a comprehen-
sive immigration policy that respects the human rights of migrants and 
ensures their integration into the Japanese society.” This illustrates the 
distance that is still necessary to be traversed toward ensuring durable 
structures that will protect foreign residents not only in good situations 
but bad situations as well. Space precludes lengthy discussion of exam-
ples of recent discriminatory acts directed at minorities, but hate speech 
directed at Korean schools has been slowly increasing ( Japan Times, 
2013). A recent court ruling declared that such rallies were not protected 
by constitutional free speech statutes. Whether the ruling will lead to 
parliamentary action is not clear, but such changes in the law outlawing 
discrimination could certainly do much to address some of the concerns 
of the UN reports cited above.
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On reviewing these three areas of contestation, the conclusion is that 
there are both positive and negative evaluations of the sustained com-
mitment to multiculturalism by the national government and down to 
local levels. As with the previous discussion, which showed that move-
ment in local areas is at the moment more expeditious than in national 
policy areas, these three foci—education, political participation, and 
anti-discrimination legislation—show the most dynamism at the local 
level (particularly with the case of political participation). However, 
here too the story is mixed, since educational opportunities are also 
quite variable depending on the locality.
2.6 East Asian multicultural societies
Comparative work done to assess the level of multicultural policy making 
across national contexts in Asia has shown that Japan has some affinities 
with other East Asian countries, South Korea and Taiwan in particular. 
Both Nagy (2013) and Kim and Oh (2011) found commonalities across 
these three countries, with low fertility rates, increasing but selective 
immigration, and “passive multiculturalism” policies. In contrast to 
the low evaluation for educational policies and anti-discrimination 
legislation, Kim and Oh argue that the mass media representations of 
foreignness vary between assimilationist and some activism in all three 
countries (2011, p. 1575). Watson (2012, p. 99) states about South Korean 
multiculturalism, similar to the critiques regarding homogeneity in 
Japan above, that the core identity of Korean society is maintained along 
ethnic lines, with foreigners simultaneously excluded, but representing 
the diversity of global progress: a “global Korea,” as such.
A more nuanced discussion of the convergences as well as divergences 
of ethnic immigrants (Korea accepting Chinese and Korean-Chinese, 
while Taiwan accepted larger numbers of Indonesians, Vietnamese 
and Thais) would suggest that regional effects of multicultural policy 
making are not insignificant. However, it is clear that multicultural 
policies in East Asia should be examined further in the near future 
with respect to regional policy comparative analysis to break down the 
obsession with borders that hinders the development of more dynamic 
multicultural models.
Miller (2011, p. 808) has written that the “gradations of inclusion 
and exclusion are far more subtle and varied in Asia” and “the bound-
aries between formal and informal rights are often blurred” based on 
less legalistic conceptions. He and Kymlicka (2005, p. 2) wrote about 
Asian multiculturalism that “appeals to international human rights 
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instruments and Western policies of multiculturalism are interspersed 
with appeals to local traditions, national mythologies, regional prac-
tices, and religious practices.” Each of these dimensions would benefit 
from more research, but it is certainly true that just as provincialized 
as Asia is in this statement, so too is the backlash of multiculturalism 
now visible in the so-called West: fierce in certain European contexts, 
while not so apparent in others, like North America. Whether it is 
really Western multiculturalism or Japanese tabunka kyoˉsei that is 
being appealed to, the point remains that the universality of human 
rights and the local, regional, and national issues that affect their 
acceptance and valorization are contentious, no matter the context. 
Learning from those who have made some contributions to creating 
communities that broaden participation to those beyond only the 
majority in any context is useful for application in other contexts. 
In any case, it can be argued, in the case of these three East Asian 
countries, that there is significant overlap in societal diversification, 
and while there is no universality of multicultural policy, there is at 
least a set of commonalities. At the same time we can note, as above, 
that much of the leeway that has been afforded with regard to local 
policy making has taken place in the absence of robust policy making 
at the national level.
2.7 Conclusion
Do the cases presented by East Asian countries, Japan in particular, as 
have been examined here, lead us to be more optimistic about the pos-
sibility of multiculturalism first of all here in Japan and Asia, but also 
in relation to the rest of the world? Probably that depends on what 
work one expects to be done in the name of multicultural policy and 
to what degree multiculturalism can be removed from limitations of its 
idealistic liberal usage and reduction to tolerance of diversity. Tolerance 
is no doubt a quality with much to offer, but it does little to solve the 
problems of mutual understanding and cooperation that are neces-
sary in communities in many places in Japan. More attention to the 
dimensions of education, political participation and representation, 
and anti-discrimination frameworks and laws are necessary to improve 
the basic conditions of a society for and of tabunka kyoˉsei. This chapter 
offers no final answer to the question of whether Japan is leading the 
way forward or struggling on its own terms. If anything, I would argue 
that is doing both, and that Japan, never having been definitively mul-
ticultural, can possibly offer a vision of the post-multicultural, but only 
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by squarely facing the problems that it is confronting from increased 
diversity in localized pockets across Japan.
Notes
 1. I acknowledge that recourse to a “common” humanity is always problem-
atic, especially from the perspective of epistemology and that here it is nec-
essary to acknowledge one’s own privilege and position. Mine, in this case, is 
as a Caucasian North American who holds a tenured position in a Japanese 
university. My view of humanity and its struggles is no doubt different from 
those who have suffered multiple and repeated instances of discrimination, 
to problematize the standpoint in just one way.
 2. The contents of the following two sections are derived in part and rewritten 
from a longer version of the argument I have made elsewhere (Bradley, 2013). 
See Alexander (2013) for extended examples of the attacks made on multicul-
turalism by both politicians and academics in Europe in the past decade.
 3. Also spelled multikulti, the term was popularized especially in Germany 
and was referenced in Angela Merkel’s 2010 speech regarding the failure of 
multicultural integrationist policies in Germany. It has been used in English 
to imply a sarcastic stance towards multicultural policies and events.
 4. In France, wearing headscarves resulted in the school expulsions of three 
girls in 1989 and 23 girls in 1996.
 5. According to May and Sleeter (2010, p. 3), critical multiculturalism differs 
from the liberal varieties by systematically accounting for “structural inequal-
ities, such as racism, institutionalized poverty and discrimination” in contrast 
to emphasizing liberal multiculturalism’s “politically muted discourses” of 
“culture and cultural recognition.”
 6. Zainichi refers to “residents,” and has been used often for “oldcomer” 
Koreans (but also some Chinese and others) whose families have been in 
Japan for three to five (or even six) generations.
 7. Modood (2012, p. 19) estimates that in most of the largest cities in northwest 
Europe the population is 20–35 percent non-European; many cities in North 
America have large percentages of immigrant populations, with Toronto and 
Miami, for example, both around or exceeding 50%.
 8. The terminology of “oldcomers,” consisting mostly of Koreans, and “new-
comers,” consisting of many other nationalities, is not uniform. I use 
“foreign resident” and “immigrant” interchangeably in this chapter, using 
the former to emphasize long-term status (particularly of Koreans, many of 
whom are long-term residents and non-citizens in Japan) and the latter to 
emphasize the evolving and changing nature of many foreigners’ stays in 
Japan from temporary to settled and finally permanent.
 9. This quote is attributed to former Prime Minister Aso Taro, at a time when he 
served as Minister of Internal Affairs in Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s 
cabinet and gave a speech at the opening of the Kyushu National Museum in 
Daizufu, Fukuoka. This is but one of a series of similar comments in the last 
several decades by cabinet ministers regarding the homogeneity of Japanese 
ethnicity.
10. I discuss these terms at length below.
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11. Statistics in this section are derived from the Japanese Ministry of Justice 
homepage statistics; Ministry of Justice 2013 and previous years).
12. A notable example was the decade long resistance against fingerprinting 
begun in 1980 and ended in 1991. For some of the history of Korean human 
rights movements, especially in relation to Korean ethnic education, see 
Okano (2006) and Tai (2007).
13. An exact percentage is hard to derive, given the discrepancies in counting 
who is foreign or not. See also footnote 8.
14. Japanese law does not allow dual citizenship, so there are many Japanese 
(exact numbers unknown) who might be considered as having multicultural 
backgrounds due to a parent of non-Japanese nationality. The term haafu is 
sometimes used for such individuals, but is controversial for several reasons. 
First, it is used mostly for those of half European and half Japanese ethnicity, 
and second because some suggest that it implies a less than whole identity.
15. Nihonjinron are theories of Japan and Japaneseness and have been critiqued 
by many for their cultural exclusivity.
16. This claim is sometimes made, policy documents notwithstanding, such as 
the 2006 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) report, 
“Research Group concerning the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence,” 
detailed below.
17. Shizuoka has large concentrations of Brazilians who emigrated to jobs in the 
auto industries and factories in smaller cities such as Hamamatsu; the only 
city of more than a million residents in a prefecture not in this list is Sapporo 
in Hokkaido (Ministry of Justice, 2013). See also Hirasawa (2009).
18. The term tabunka kyoˉsei is widely attributed to origins in discussions of 
biological phenomena in phrases like shizen to kyoˉsei: coexistence with the 
environment. According to Lovell (2010, p. 5) some have translated it as “mul-
ticultural symbiosis” or “symbiotic multiculturalism,” maintaining the bio-
logical roots. He also writes of the phrase tomo ni ikiru (living together) which 
was used from 1965 onwards by the Japanese government in commitments to 
improving civil rights for resident Koreans. Chapman (2006, pp. 98–99) also 
describes the use of tabunka kyoˉsei for disparate groups such as children with 
disabilities and to address gender inequities. According to Hirasawa (2009, 
p. 165) the term tabunka kyoˉsei was used by a policy document in Kawasaki 
City in 1993 for the first time. Nakamatsu (2013, p. 5) also cites 1993 as the 
first newspaper mention but in relation to development education. Some have 
argued that tabunka shakai is a more sociological and inclusive term.
19. Ainu people, whose origin was in northern Japan and Hokkaido, were 
acknowledged as an indigenous people by the Japanese government in 2008 
(unlike Okinawans who have not been formally recognized). They have also 
used the name Utari to refer to themselves.
20. Buraku, or more formally Hisabetsu Burakumin (people of the hamlet subject 
to discrimination; a discrimination based on ancestry, dating from the Edo 
Period, 1603–1868, in which a caste system was prevalent in Japan, which is 
now illegal) are non-identifiable by names or physical characteristics. They 
number from 2 to 3 million, and similar to the previous discussion of Ainu, 
it is difficult to arrive at an exact figure due to stigma of self-identification 
and intermarriage. However in recent years, a number of well-known politi-
cians and public figures have made their Buraku background open.
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21. In preparing this chapter, I was able to find Breivik’s manifesto online. 
I deliberately chose not to cite it, so as not to give further publicity to a racist 
polemic. However, it is instructive in that he clearly believes that the East 
Asian countries ( Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) have achieved their suc-
cesses through maintaining traditional societal patterns of monoethnicity 
and patriarchal relations.
22. Nikkei refer to people with Japanese ethnic heritage who have settled 
predominantly in North and South America, a number of whom returned 
to Japan in the last 20 years. A number of them were forced to leave after 
the economic downturn of 2008, in some cases receiving money from the 
Japanese government for repatriation, stipulating that they would not return 
to Japan for a minimum of three years.
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